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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I presented two essays motivated by the observation that financial crises 
tend to be accompanied by deeper recessions and slower recoveries, partly due to 
debt burden (e.g. Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Hong and Tornell, 2005; Jordà, et al., 2013).   
 
In the first essay I evaluate this claim against the contrasting view that magnitude 
and persistence of recessions is rather the consequence of bigger and more persistent 
shocks (Stock & Watson, 2012). To do so, I compute recovery and recession paths 
through the estimation of impulse responses by local projections methods (Jordà, 
2005). I found that the occurrence of financial crises is associated with more severe 
recessions only if the recession itself is big enough. But this effect disappears when 
the output loss caused by the recession is below the historical average. More 
importantly, neither the magnitude of the loss, nor the occurrence of financial crises, 
nor debt accumulation are associated with sluggish output growth during recoveries. 
 
It has also being suggested that expectations prior to the crisis help to determine the 
magnitude and length of recessions following financial crises (Chauvet and Guo, 
2003; Cerra and Saxena, 2008). This and the role of pre-crisis dynamics is not properly 
reflected in standard DSGE models. In the second essay I account for the effect of pre-
crisis dynamics and evaluate whether financial crises are different. To do so, I 
introduce optimism (in the form of unrealised news about capital quality) in an 
otherwise standard DSGE model with financial frictions. Under this framework, 
optimism generates investment–debt / boom-bust cycles accompanied by long 
recessions. I found that within this framework cycles associated with financial and 
technology news shocks are different regarding the responses of asset prices and 
banks’ net worth. Real variables respond similarly to unjustified financial or 
technological optimism. 
 
Keywords:  Financial crises, deep recessions, slow recoveries, local projections, boom 
– bust cycles, financial constraints, debt overhang, news shocks 
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1 BIG RECESSIONS AND SLOW RECOVERIES 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent episodes of financial crisis in developed countries, such as the subprime crisis 
in the United States that led to the great recession in 2007-2009, have emphasised the 
widely supported idea that economic downturns that are accompanied by financial 
crisis tend to be bigger and longer than other economic crises (e.g. Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2009). To that extent, a bulk of empirical literature has dealt with the measurement 
of the real effects of financial crisis. A recurrent suggestion from this literature is that 
debt burden plays an important role in determining the duration and magnitude of 
the recessions (e.g. Hong and Tornell, 2005 and Jordà, et al., 2013 and 2015). 
Conversely, other studies have found that financial crises have small or no effect on 
the severity of the recessions, as well as on the speed of recovery (e.g. Romer and 
Romer, 2015). It has been suggested as an alternative explanation that the crisis 
severity and speed of recovery are correlated with the size and persistence of the 
underlying shocks and that the effect of the financial nature of the crisis is negligible 
(Romer and Romer, 2015; Stock and Watson, 2012). Therefore, this last branch of 
literature suggests that slow recoveries are somewhat associated with deep 
recessions. 
This mixed evidence set a dilemma between the two approaches and bring about the 
question whether recessions and recoveries are significantly different when 
accompanied by a financial crises or if this has something to do with the magnitude 
of the recession itself. To shed some light on this debate an empirical examination of 
the two positions is performed in this paper using the macro-financial data base 
gathered by Jordà et al. ( 2017).  
In other words, the purpose of this paper is twofold. On one hand, I evaluate whether 
financial crises, and excessive debt play a role determining the severity of the 
recession and speed of recovery. And on the other hand, an evaluation of the effect 
on output dynamics of the magnitude of the shock itself is performed. This is done 
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using local projection methods to estimate recession and recovery paths as in Jordà, 
et al. (2013). 
The business cycle dynamics literature is related to this chapter, particularly the 
literature on whether business cycles accompanied by financial crises are different 
and on the sources of business cycles fluctuations. With respect to the shocks driving 
macroeconomic fluctuations, the literature has focused mainly on three: technology, 
monetary and fiscal shocks. Estimations of medium-scale DSGE 
models have highlighted the importance of identifying the contributions to output 
volatility by fluctuation sources (Smets and Wouters, 2003 and 2007). Then a problem 
that economists have had to tackle is how to identify such shocks (For a review see 
Ramey, 2016). This is of great importance if you try to compare episodes with 
different characteristics (for instance financial crisis with normal recessions). 
Regarding, the effect of financial crises, most of the studies have found evidence 
supporting the idea that financial crises are accompanied by deeper and longer 
recessions. And most of them have used data for both developed and developing 
countries (v.g. Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009) or developing countries data exclusively 
(Berkmen, et al., 2012; Hong & Tornell, 2005). The identification strategy for the 
financial crisis episodes has been predominantly discursive (v.g. Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2009; Claessens, et al., 2009; Bordo, et al., 2001; Jordà, et al., 2013, 2015 and 2017). This 
implies that most of the studies relied on dummy variables as indicators of the 
financial turmoil, and as Romer and Romer (2015) have highlighted, have used the 
peak to trough decline on output as a measure of the deepness of the recession. 
In this respect, Romer and Romer (2015) and Stock and Watson (2012) differ from 
most of the literature in both the identification strategy and on the focus on 
developed countries. The former uses a modified discursive strategy, focusing on the 
cost of financial intermediation and assigning different values to the variable 
depending on the severity of the financial disruption. Then they use Jorda’s (2005) 
local projection methods to estimate the effects of financial turmoil on the severity of 
the recession. They have also remarked on some problems with previous financial 
crisis effect literature including estimation bias and reverse causation. On the other 
hand, Stock and Watson (2012) use a dynamic factor model to identify the different 
shocks and quantify their contribution to output volatility for different recession 
episodes in the USA. As mention before, both studies found evidence that the 
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severity of the recession is related to the magnitude and persistence of the underlying 
shocks. 
By estimating recession paths using the Jordà method, Jordà et al. (2013 and 2015) 
and Romer and Romer (2015) reduce the downwards bias of the crisis in countries 
with very strong trend growth. Notwithstanding the reverse causation problem 
remains in the sense that crisis might be the result and the cause of recessions. 
I use a very similar approach here. Unlike Jordà et al. (2013 and 2015), I control for 
the magnitude of the shock by grouping the data according to the deviation of the 
growth rate with respect to the country-specific historical mean. This allows me to 
evaluate the size claim by Romer and Romer (2005) and Stock and Watson (2012). 
Reverse causation remains a problem for the estimation of recession paths, and 
therefore the magnitude of the financial crises effect on the output loss. But this 
problem is reduced when estimating the effects of the financial crisis and the 
magnitude of the shock on the speed of recovery. This is one of the contributions of 
the chapter with respect to previous literature. 
 In this respect, I found evidence suggesting that neither financial nature of the crisis 
nor the severity of the recession is associated with slower recoveries. This is, the 
output growth rate following either a big or a financial recession is not significantly 
sluggish compared with small or non-financial recessions. On the other hand, when 
grouped by size, financial crises are not accompanied by deeper than usual recessions 
if they are small.  
Financial recessions are statistically distinguishable from normal downturns only if 
the output loss is above the historical mean. Additionally, some support is given to 
Jordà, et al. (2013) finding that debt accumulation during the expansion helps to 
determine the magnitude of the recession. This evidence is more significant for big 
non-financial recessions. 
Furthermore, the claim that the magnitude and persistence of the underlying shock 
are determinants for both the severity of the recession and the speed of recovery, 
implies that standard DSGE models should be enough to explain these two features 
of the data. I analysed this using simulated data from a basic RBC model and found 
that the model is able to reproduce big and small recessions and that the recoveries 
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are not associated with the size of the shock. In fact, recovery period growth after big 
recessions seems to be slightly faster than after episodes with small output losses. 
Overall, the evidence found in this paper suggest that neither the financial nature of 
the crisis nor the magnitude of the shocks producing the downturn are associated 
with sluggish recoveries. It is also found that debt run-ups play a statistically 
significant role in determining the magnitude of the recession but it has no significant 
effect on output growth during recovery.  
Other factors should be playing a role determining both the magnitude of the 
recession and the speed of recovery. Gali, et al. (2012) identify policy tightness (zero 
lower bound), risk premium and investment specific technology shocks as the main 
drivers of slow recoveries in the US. It is needed to dig further into the determinants 
of slow recoveries but that is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future 
research. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: in the next section, the data and 
identification of the turning points are described. The methodology for the estimation 
of recession and recovery paths and the initial data analysis are presented in section 
3. Section 4 contains the initial regression analysis regarding the magnitude and 
financial crises effects. Section 5 presents the analysis of the effect of debt 
accumulation on both recession and recovery paths. Section 6, explains the 
robustness of the regression results to the inclusion of economic controls. In section 
7, an estimation of recession paths is presented to evaluate whether a basic RBC 
model is able to generate what we observe in the data. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
1.2 DATA AND TURNING POINTS IDENTIFICATION 
 
In this paper, I used the panel data information gathered by Jordà et al. (2017). This 
panel has information for 17 developed economies from 1870 to 2013 on annual 
frequency. It includes variables for the real economy, credit, government and 
financial crisis dates among others. For the purpose of this paper, I am using the 
series real per capita GDP, consumption per capita, investment to GDP ratio, total 
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loans, population, price index, current account and a systemic financial crises 
identifier. A description of this data is provided in the Appendix to the chapter. 
On the other hand, to be able to determine whether recession and recovery paths 
differ across episodes according to the characterizations by size and financial nature, 
business cycle turning points need to be identified. To do so, I use the Harding and 
Pagan (2002) algorithm for annual frequency, which is equivalent to the use of Bry 
and Boschan (1971) algorithm. In practice, this is similar to identifying the last 
positive growth period in a sequence as a peak, with the advantage that the algorithm 
guarantees that peaks and troughs alternate. 
I identify turning points for a single variable (real GDP) and perform the analysis in 
terms of how output behaves during recessions and recoveries. Given the frequency 
of the data and the purpose of the paper, there are no great gains from using a 
multivariable turning points identification strategy.  
Accordingly, 375 peaks and troughs are identified. Following Jordà et al. (2013) I 
excluded from the data episodes that are influenced by wars. To do so, peaks 
happening 2 years after a war or 5 years before were excluded (and its corresponding 
trough too). I also excluded recessions for which there are not enough data points to 
get a full window for a recession path. As a consequence, peaks and troughs 
happening on or after 2009 are excluded. Then the sample is reduced to 278 usable 
peaks. 
Additionally, the analysis presented here requires recessions to be classified as being 
accompanied or not by a financial crisis. This is done using the systemic financial 
crisis variable. This variable was built using the results from previous literature on 
financial crises including Bordo et al. (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), among 
others (Jordà, et al., 2017). A recession is labelled as financial if a crisis episode is 
reported 2 years before or after the peak. This is done avoiding the association of a 
crisis episode to more than one recession by favouring the episode that is preceded 
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by a financial crisis. As can be seen in Table 1.1, this results in 71 out of 278 usable 
peak observations classified as financial.1  
Table 1.1 Number of usable peaks by phases of financial development and type of episode 
 
To consider varying economic conditions (average growth and volatility) and 
differences in credit access across time, data is partitioned according to the four 
phases of financial development as proposed in Jordà et al (2013)2. These phases are: 
the pre-World War I period (1870-1914), the interwar period (1918-1939), the Bretton 
Woods period (1945-1971) and the post Breton Woods period (1972-2013).3   It is 
interesting to notice that no recessions are classified as financial during the Bretton 
Woods period. 
A second classification needed for the analysis is the one regarding the size of the 
recession measured as the logarithmic percentage difference between the peak and 
the next trough, i.e. the accrued loss during the contractionary phase of the cycle. 
Using this variable, a recession is classified as big if the output loss exceeds its mean 
for a particular country during a particular phase of financial development4.  
 
                                                     
 
1 Episodes classified as financial by Jordà et al. (2013) are also classified as that following 
this methodology. 
2 This also allows for comparability of the results found in this paper with theirs. 
3 The use of an alternative partition of the data using the WWII as threshold does not change 
the qualitative results. 
4 The qualitative results hold, when we define big as output losses that are 1 standard deviation 
above the mean. 
Phases of Financial 
Development 
Non-Financial Financial Total 
Pre WWI 112 29 141 
Inter-Wars 20 19 39 
Bretton Woods 25 0 25 
Post Bretton Woods 50 23 73 
Total 207 71 278 
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Table 1.2 Number of usable peaks by type, magnitude of the episode and phases of financial 
development 
 
As can be seen in Table 1.2., about half the financial crises are classified as big. In total 
there are 105 recession episodes where the output loss exceeded the respective 
historical mean. It can also be observed that most of the recessions classified as non-
financial are also small (138 episodes). In the next section I analyse further the data 
according to the classifications used in the paper. Also I explain how local projections 
are used in this paper to estimate the average recession paths for each of these groups 
of recessions.  
In Table 1.2., we can also see the number of usable episodes by phases of financial 
development, the severity of the recession and financial nature of the episode. 
Interestingly, during the inter-wars period most of the financial recessions produced 
below average output losses. Moreover, a higher number of non-financial rather than 
financial recessions were classified as big. 
The financial recessions categorised as big include the great depression in the United 
States, the 1929 episodes in France Italy and Japan and the 1930 recessions in Norway 
and Sweden. Meanwhile, the big non-financial recessions include among others the 
1923 Danish recession, the 1925 and 1929 British recessions, and the 1929 Swiss and 
Dutch episodes. The 1929 non-financial recession can be linked to the great 
depression in the USA, but they were the by-product of trade no financial effects of 
the latter 
In the next section, I analyse further the data according to the classifications used in 
the paper. I also explain the usage of local projections in this paper to estimate the 







Pre 1st WW 78 14 92 34 15 49
Inter-Wars 11 13 24 9 6 15
Bretton Woods 13 0 13 12 0 12
Post Bretton Woods 35 8 43 15 15 30
Total 137 35 172 70 36 106
Small Big
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1.3 BIG RECESSIONS AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the claims that 
financial crises are accompanied by deeper and longer recessions on the one hand 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). And on the other, that this effect is negligible and slow 
recoveries are rather associated with a magnitude effect of the recession itself (Stock 
& Watson, 2012). That is, the magnitude of the recession is, if anything, weakly 
associated with financial crises and the speed of recovery depends on the magnitude 
and persistence of the underlying shocks. 
The first step to asses those statements is to analyse the raw data on recession 
episodes according to the classifications presented in the previous section. In 
particular, to examine the mean and variance of recession magnitudes corresponding 
to financial or non-financial episodes. In terms of severity, Table 1.3 shows that both 
the output loss mean and standard deviation are bigger for episodes accompanied 
by financial crises. This is true for almost all phases of financial development with 
the exception of the inter-wars period when the opposite is true.  
 
Table 1.3 Average accrued output loss (peak-to-through output reduction) by financial 
development phase, size and financial nature of the crisis 
  
 This suggests that financial crises are, on average, accompanied by more severe 
recessions. Notwithstanding, there is a caveat: the dispersion of the severity of the 
recession is also greater for financial crises, implying that financial crises can also be 





-3.4151 -4.1269 -1.9281 -1.2645 -1.8271 -6.8265 -6.7985 -6.8179
(3.5518) (3.9521) (1.5124) (1.5152) (1.5234) (4.4586) (3.6424) (4.1876)
-9.2770 -6.5479 -3.4129 -3.2632 -3.3318 -16.4442 -13.6648 -15.3324
(11.7197) (8.0778) (4.6298) (3.3222) (3.8838) (13.9407) (10.9353) (12.4799)
-1.2843 . -0.7335 . -0.7335 -1.8810 . -1.8810
(1.0997) . (.6438) . (.6438) (1.1999) . (1.1999)
-2.2169 -4.2949 -1.2684 -1.7114 -1.3508 -4.4302 -5.7713 -5.0776
(2.1378) (2.9376) (1.0689) (.8477) (1.0369) (2.3924) (2.6643) (2.5735)
-3.4347 -4.8369 -1.7654 -2.1090 -1.8353 -6.7018 -7.5647 -6.9894
(4.9929) (5.2056) (1.8956) (2.4003) (2.0057) (7.1402) (5.8234) (6.714)
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In fact, differences between financial and non-financial episodes are reduced when 
the sample is divided by size. Thus, it seems that the conclusion of financial 
recessions being more painful than normal recessions does not necessarily hold. This 
seems to be in accordance with the view that the crisis severity and speed of recovery 
are correlated with the size and persistence of the underlying shocks (Romer & 
Romer, 2015; Stock & Watson, 2012). 







Financial Financial Total 
Non-
Financial Financial Total 
1 year 
3.6137 3.5186 3.2925 2.9789 3.2348 4.2711 4.1932 4.2501 
(2.7655) (2.5587) (2.6704) (1.9871) (2.5558) (2.86) (3.0418) (2.8928) 
2 years 
5.4235 5.4026 4.7929 5.2060 4.8690 6.7136 5.6484 6.4264 
(4.2133) (4.0389) (3.7262) (3.2612) (3.6391) (4.8465) (4.9059) (4.8579) 
3 years 
7.5944 6.6443 6.5763 5.9981 6.4696 9.4057 7.2167 8.7217 
(6.0151) (6.8792) (5.2774) (7.2795) (5.679) (6.8098) (6.5571) (6.7793) 
Notes: Standard deviation in parenthesis 
  
Regarding the speed of recovery, Table 1.4 shows the average accrued growth one, 
two and three years after the trough. This data suggest that there are no significant 
differences between growth rates during the recovery of financial and non-financial 
recessions. Interestingly, it also shows that big recessions’ average recovery speed is 
faster than that of smaller recessions. I confirm these results with the regression 
analysis that is presented in the following sections of the paper. 
The visual examination of the moments of the magnitude of the recession and speeds 
of recovery by size and financial nature is not enough to draw sound conclusions. 
But it suggests that it is necessary to group data by size to get a clear picture of the 
role played by the financial nature of the episodes, so that this is not confused with a 
scale effect as suggested by some authors (v.g. Stock & Watson, 2012 and Romer & 
Romer, 2015). 
To unveil the correlation between big recessions, financial crises and slow recoveries 
in the next two sections of the paper an empirical evaluation of size and financial 
crisis effects is performed. To do so, the recession and recovery paths are estimated 
using local projection methods (Jordà, 2005). With a twofold purpose of making the 
results comparable to the ones found by Jordà, et al. (2013) and to evaluate the claim 
that debt burden plays a role in determining the magnitude and duration of a crisis, 
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I interact credit excess with the classification variables and include the same controls 
used by the aforementioned authors.  
According to this methodology, recession and recovery paths are defined as the 
cumulative impulse responses of output growth to a particular shock as in Jordà et 
al (2013, 2015). For the purpose of this chapter, it is enough to classify the shocks in 
terms of financial, non-financial, big and small categories. Also, the recoveries are 
defined as the responses from the trough to the same dummy variables. In practice, 
we need to estimate the following regression for every horizon point (h=1-5): 
Δℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
Here Δℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ stands for the log difference of output between periods t and t+h, 𝛼 is 
the common constant, 𝛼𝑖 are individual country i fixed effects. The variable 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 
is a dummy taking the value of one when the shock hits. In the context of this work, 
the dummy variables indicate either a peak or a trough and whether the recession 
associated with them is classified as financial, non-financial, big or small. Finally, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
is a vector of covariates and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  is the vector of robust errors associated with the 
estimation.  
The estimation is done using panel data fixed effects and errors are clustered at the 
country level. In this way, errors are allowed to be auto-correlated. This is necessary 
to get valid inference from LP estimators (Jordà, 2005) and it is the equivalent to HAC 
errors in a time series framework. 
The parameters of interest are the common trend (𝛼) and the marginal cumulative 
effect of the shock (𝛽1 ). The sum of the two gives us the average recession and 
recovery paths depending on whether we are using peak or trough dummies. In the 
next section, an assessment of whether recession and recovery paths differ 
significantly among classifications is presented. To do so, I use the financial database 
for 17 developed countries gathered by Jordà, et al. (2017). In a latter section, we use 
this same methodology and simulated data to find out whether macroeconomic 
theory is able to reproduce the patterns found in the data and to get some insight on 
the claim that the magnitude of the shock is correlated with the speed of recovery. 
 
Essays on Financial Crises 11 
1.4 AN EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL CRISES AND MAGNITUDE 
EFFECTS. 
 
It has been claimed that financial crises have a differential effect on economic growth 
in the short and the medium run producing deeper recession and slower recoveries 
(e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 and Claessens, et al., 2009). If this is true in general, 
then they should have different recession and recovery paths regardless of the group 
size. To evaluate this, following the strategy described in the last section, I estimate 
these paths using local projections (Jordà, 2005). Initially, the following two equations 
with only dummy shocks are estimated: 
(1) Δℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  
(2) Δℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  
Here B stands for big, S for Small, F for Financial and N for non-financial. The time 
horizon h refers to the number of periods ahead of either the peak or the trough. As 
indicated before, when dummy variables take the value of one at peaks the estimated 
cumulative impulse responses correspond to the recession paths. Conversely, when 
unitary values are taken at troughs, the estimation results can be interpreted as 
recovery paths. These paths are computed as the sum of 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑗 where j stands for B, 
S, F or N; and 𝛼 can be interpreted as the average growth trend net of countries fixed 
effects.  
The estimation is done using panel data fixed effects and errors are clustered at the 
country level. In this way, errors are allowed to be auto-correlated. Recession paths 
estimated using equation 2 (right panel of Figure 1) are qualitatively equivalent to 
the results reported in Table 5 in Jordà, et al. (2013, p. 13). Quantitative differences 
with respect to those results might arise since the data available has been reviewed 
and augmented in terms of coverage. 
From these regressions we can conclude that average financial recessions seem to be 
deeper and one year longer than non-financial ones. While on average non-financial 
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recession losses are fully recovered after one year, it takes two years to recover from 
a financial recession (this is until year 4).5  
Figure 1.1 Recession paths without controls 
Recession Paths by Size Financial non-Financial Recession Paths 
    
Notes: Error bands at 5% of significance 
 
As can be noticed in Figure 1.1 Recession paths without controls, these same results 
are extendable to big recessions when comparing them with small ones. This might 
be due to a much higher proportion of financial recessions being categorized as big. 
I will show later that when grouped by size financial crises matter only if the 
recession is severe enough. That is, there are no significant differences between 
normal and financial episodes when output losses are small. In other words, for a 
recession to be more severe it is not enough to be accompanied by a financial crisis. 
On the other hand, estimations of recovery paths are reported in Figure 1.2. In this 
case, the sum 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑗 in equations 1 and 2 corresponds to the cumulative growth rate 
h years after the trough. The results from these estimations suggest that financial 
recessions do not seem to exhibit a significantly different recovery path from a non-
financial recession (right panel, Figure 1.2).6  
 
                                                     
 
5 This is no longer true when allowing a financial crisis episodes to be associated with more 
than one recession when we do not include controls. In this case the financial recession is not 
significantly different from the non-financial for the whole sample. 
6 This result is consistent when allowing for a financial crisis episode to be associated with 




















0 1 2 3 4 5
Non Financial
Financial
Essays on Financial Crises 13 
Figure 1.2 Recovery paths without controls 
Recovery Paths by Size Financial non-Financial Recovery Paths 
    
Notes: Error bands at 5% of significance 
 
Regarding the severity of the recession, growth rates during recoveries from big 
recessions seem to be higher than from small recessions on average. This implies that 
the time to recover from an average big or a financial recession is longer due to a scale 
effect. This means that it takes longer to recover from a bigger loss at a given growth 
rate. It also implies that other factors should be playing a role in determining the 
speed of recovery. 
Some previous findings for the last three recessions in the US, suggest that the zero 
lower bound and wage rigidities played a role determining the speed of recovery 
(Gali, et al., 2012). A similar role has been attributed to fiscal consolidation. The most 
frequent culprit in the literature is debt overhang (e.g. Hong & Tornell, 2005). The 
latter will be evaluated in a following section.  
 
Financial nature is only important if the recession is big 
Up to now, the evidence presented shows remarkable similarities between the results 
obtained using financial and size dummies. By interacting these two categories, we 
can get further insight about the average recession and recovery paths. To do so, a 
regression of cumulative growth as a function of the interaction of the dummy 
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(3) ∆ℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑏𝑓𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑏𝑛𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑠𝑛𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 
 
Here N, F, B, S are defined as before and 𝛽𝑗𝑘 is the response of the cumulative growth 
to the interaction of the treatment variables identifying recessions episodes by size 
(j={b,s}) and financial non-financial nature (k={f,n}). This is equivalent to estimating 
equation 2 grouping by size. 
Figure 1.3 Recession paths grouped by size including controls 
Small recessions Big recessions 
  
Notes: Error bands at 5% of significance 
 
The results of this regression are plotted in Figure 1.3. It is observed that small 
recessions are not significantly different among them irrespective of whether they 
are classified as financial or not. Some of Jordà et. al (2013) results still hold 
conditional on output losses being higher than the historical mean during a particular 
financial development phase (right panel Figure 1.3). Taking this condition into 
account, financial crises are accompanied by recessions 1 year longer on average. This 
implies that the cumulative output loss is around 2 percentage points bigger on 
average. As a consequence the economy is significantly below its initial output level 
4 years after a peak associated with a financial crisis. 
On the other hand, the average economy is fully recovered from a non-financial big 
recession 4 years after the trough. These numbers are considerably higher than the 
single year it takes for an average economy to recover from a small recession 
(whether financial or not). These results are consistent when using an alternative 
financial recession identification that allows for financial crises episodes to be linked 
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Figure 1.4 Recovery paths grouped by size including controls 
Small recessions Big recessions 
  
Notes: Error bands at 5% of significance 
 
Regarding recovery paths (Figure 1.4), as before, we can get the cumulative impulse 
responses to the treatment variables by changing the reference point to the trough in 
equation 3. In this case the results suggest that the recovery paths are not significantly 
different whether recessions are accompanied by a financial crisis or not. This means 
that, in terms of output growth rates during the recovery, there are no differences 
between financial and non-financial episodes.  
This confirms the results reported when using equation 2. We can conclude also that 
there are no significant differences among recoveries from big and small recessions. 
This also confirms that on average big recession take longer to recover because the 
output loss is bigger and not because of a slower growth rate. 
 
The usual suspects 
From the analysis up to this point we observe that deep recessions can be 
accompanied by financial crises, but this is not an unequivocal relationship. There 
are deep recessions that are not related with financial crises and there are financial 
crises accompanied by small recessions. Then the determinants of the size of the 
recession, and therefore the time of recovery, are not necessarily associated to the 
nature of the crisis. The usual culprits in the literature are debt overhang (v.g. 
Dell’Ariccia et al, 2008; Hong and Tornell, 2005; Kannan, 2012; Jorda et al, 2013), asset 
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2012), Monetary and fiscal policy tightness (v.g. Hall, 2016; Gali et al., 2012) among 
other causes that might be also associated with slow recoveries.  
Notice that the results showed that the size of the recessions does not seem to 
determine the speed of recovery. But finding the determinants of the size of the 
recession might be important for the duration of the recovery. To do so we add to the 
analysis the most usual explanation in the literature in the next section. This is: debt 
accumulation. Exploring other alternatives is out of the scope of this paper and is left 
for future research. 
 
1.5 DEBT RUN-UP AND OUTPUT LOSS 
 
Jordà et al. (2013) evaluated the effect on the recession paths of credit excess – defined 
as the deviation in percentage points of the average credit to GDP ratio growth 
during the expansion from its historical average during a particular phase. They 
concluded that credit excess has a significant negative impact on the recession paths 
whether accompanied by a financial crisis or not. This is, recessions are deeper and 
longer if there was excessive credit growth during the expansion.  
 
Figure 1.5 Density of credit excess by size and financial nature of the crisis 
 
Notes: Small recessions are grouped together irrespective of whether accompanied by a 
financial crisis or not. 
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As can be seen in Figure 1.5, a high percentage of big financial crisis are preceded by 
“excessive” debt to GDP ratio growth. Additionally, looking at the distributions of 
credit excess for the three classification, there seems not to be a clear difference 
between them. This suggests that if excessive debt plays a role independently from 
the magnitude of the recession or the occurrence of financial crises, then the effect 
should be similar across types of episodes.  
To evaluate the importance of debt run ups, we should compute the different 
recession paths accounting for credit excess. Given the availability of data on credit 
excess, the usable sample of business cycles peaks is reduced to 245, of which 65 are 
associated with financial crisis, 89 exhibit excess credit and 98 recessions are 
considered big.   
Since the number of big financial and small financial recessions preceded by 
abnormal debt to GDP ratio growth are just 22 and 12 respectively, the assessment of 
the effect of a debt run-up on the severity of a recession is done using credit excess 
variable (E) as previously defined instead of using a treatment dummy. To do so, the 
following regression is estimated: 
(4) ∆ℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑏𝑓𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑏𝑛𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽𝑏𝑓𝑑𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Ε𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑏𝑛𝑑𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Ε𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑑𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Ε𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
We already showed that financial recessions are only different from non-financial 
conditional on being deep. As a consequence, in equation 4 the interaction between 
the dummies small and financial is excluded. This means that we are having results 
for small recessions, big non-financial and big financial episodes. This should not 
make a big difference in terms of the interpretation of the results since they are 
focused on the contribution of debt overhang to deep recessions and speed of 
recovery. 
As can be noted by the results reported in Table 1.5, the significant effects on the 
recession paths vary widely among types of episodes. All episodes seem to be deeper 
when accompanied by excessive debt. While the most significant effects are for big 
non-financial recessions. For the latter, one percentage point of credit excess implies 
an additional cumulative output loss of 2.111% with respect to the peak after 5 years 
on average. This is much bigger than the average effect on small recessions (0.41%).  
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Table 1.5 Regression results: Interactions with credit excess from peak 
VARIABLES Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
      
Small x  
Credit Excess 
-0.0647** -0.148* -0.197* -0.376** -0.410** 
(0.0251) (0.0748) (0.112) (0.132) (0.146) 
Big x  
Credit Excess 
-0.183 -0.835*** -1.386*** -1.898*** -2.111*** 
(0.189) (0.186) (0.376) (0.615) (0.587) 
Financial x 
Credit Excess 
0.231 -0.411** -0.340 -0.248 -0.213 
(0.136) (0.147) (0.295) (0.339) (0.410) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
On the other hand, it seems that most of the effect of debt run ups recessions is 
concentrated in the magnitude of the output loss and that it only affects the paths of 
big non-financial episodes (Figure 1.6). This is confirmed by the results of the 
regression from the trough reported in Table 1.6, according to which there are no 
significant effects of debt run-ups on growth rates during the recoveries at 5% of 
significance for every type of episode.   
 
Figure 1.6 Typical recession paths and debt run-up effect. 
Small Big non-Financial Big Financial 
   
___ Recesion path 
___ Recession path with 1 percentage point of credit excess 
Notes: Error bands at 95% of significance. 
 
The rationale for this could be associated with two effects of debt run-ups. Firstly, if 
this is due to a high public debt, governments will be forced to pursue fiscal 
consolidation programmes causing an initial deeper output loss. Secondly, financial 
frictions literature suggest that negative shocks associated with financial crises, 
restrict credit and slow the pace of investment delaying recovery (e.g. Bernanke and 
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only the magnitude of the recession itself but no hurting the growth potential of the 
economy on the medium run. 
 
Table 1.6 Regression results: Interactions with credit excess from trough 
VARIABLES Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
           
Small x  
Credit Excess 
-0.0824 -0.0620 -0.275* -0.291* -0.259 
(0.0766) (0.125) (0.134) (0.161) (0.229) 
Big x  
Credit Excess 
0.157 -0.0290 0.0677 -0.248 0.157 
(0.139) (0.273) (0.367) (0.527) (0.566) 
Financial x 
Credit Excess 
0.00968 0.538 0.666 0.861 1.048 
(0.200) (0.583) (0.696) (0.848) (0.713) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To sum up, credit excess has a significant effect on the severity of the recession but 
not on the speed of recovery. This effect is less important for small recessions and for 
recoveries from big financial recessions. Given their mixed significance, it is needed 
to check whether debt accumulation effects disappear once controls are introduced 
in section 6. 
 
1.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECK: INCLUDING ECONOMIC COVARIATES 
 
The results reported in the previous section suggest that recessions that are big are 
significantly different from small recession but only with respect to the size of the 
shock. This is, the magnitude of the loss is not associated with a slower recovery. This 
is also true for financial recessions.  
Regarding the effect of debt on recessions and recovery paths, findings from previous 
literature (Jordà, et al., 2013) are somewhat confirmed with some caveats. Big non-
financial recessions are the most significantly affected by excessive debt 
accumulation. Excess debt growth has a magnifying effect on output loss, but growth 
during the recovery seem to be not significantly affected. As with size and financial 
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crisis effect, debt overhang seem to play no role determining the speed of recovery, 
defined as the growth rate during the recovery.  
Notwithstanding, these results are not entirely believable, since omitted variable bias 
could be present. This is, the dynamics of output growth is determined by more 
factors apart from the nature of the crisis or whether the recovery is caused by a big 
or a small shock. To remove this possible bias, regression 3 is modified by 
introducing economic controls as follows: 








Where (𝛼 + 𝛽𝑗) is a point of the average recession or recovery path associated with 
treatment 𝑇𝑗,𝑖 . Notice that here treatment j refers to the interaction of financial 
dummies with size dummies, such that we are having 4 groups as in equation 3. 
Finally, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 is a matrix of economic controls.  
For comparability with the results reported by Jordà et al. (2013) in what follows I am 
reporting the results of this regression when including the same controls used by 
them. These controls are: the growth rates of real GDP per capita and real total loans 
per capita, the CPI inflation rate, the short-term and long-term interest rates, the 
investment to GDP and the current account to GDP ratios. Controls are included 
contemporaneously and lagged one period. 
 
Figure 1.7 Recession paths estimation including controls 
Small Big 
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The results reported in Figure 1.7 are consistent with the ones found with regression 
3. Small recession are statistically the same whether financial or not. Big recessions 
are deeper than small ones and when they are accompanied by a financial crises they 
experienced a second year of negative growth and therefore the output loss 
associated with them is bigger.  
When the analysis is made for recovery paths (Figure 1.8.), we can conclude that 
average growth rates during recovery are not affected significantly by the nature of 
the crisis and that big recessions are recovering at a higher growth rate than small 
recessions. This is also a robust result from previous sections. 
 
Figure 1.8 Recovery paths estimation including controls 
Small Big 
  
Notes: Error bands at 95% of significance. 
 
In section 5 we found that debt run-ups have a significant impact on the magnitude 
of the recession especially for big non-financial recessions. Again, to confirm those 
results, we run a regression with controls 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 as in equation 6 including treatment 
dummies for small, big non-financial and big financial episodes. Interactions 
between these three dummy variables and the excess credit variable are also included. 
(6) ∆ℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝑗





+ 𝑈𝑖,𝑡  
 
In this specification the δ𝑗  parameters are giving us the impact of 1 additional 
percentage point credit excess on the recession and recovery paths for the average 





















0 1 2 3 4 5
Non-Financial
Financial
Essays on Financial Crises 22 
the 5% for small recessions in year 1 and for big non-financial recessions from the 
second year onwards. 7  
 
Table 1.7 Regression results: Interactions with credit excess from peak 
VARIABLES Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
      
Small*Credit Excess 
-0.0961** -0.163* -0.105 -0.155 -0.246 
(0.0381) (0.0814) (0.120) (0.132) (0.184) 
Big*Credit Excess 
-0.372* -0.805** -1.203** -1.622** -1.691** 
(0.199) (0.287) (0.501) (0.676) (0.645) 
Financial*Credit Excess 
0.153 -0.374* -0.178 0.0321 0.166 
(0.145) (0.184) (0.288) (0.317) (0.382) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Figure 1.9 Regression results: Interactions with credit excess from peak 
Small Big non-Financial Big Financial 
   
___ Recesion path 
___ Recession path with 1 percentage point of credit excess 
Notes: Error bands at 95% of significance. 
 
Furthermore, it can be seen in Figure 1.9 that on average credit excess negatively 
affects growth for big non-financial recessions, such that the contribution keeps 
growing until it reaches about 1.7 additional percentage points of output loss after 5 
years. It is also noticeable that once controls are introduced the significance of the 
effect of credit excess on small and big financial recessions diminishes.  
                                                     
 
7 One possible explanation for the effect on big financial recessions to be less important could 
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When the regression is run taking the trough as a reference point, I found that credit 
excess has a significant impact at 5% only for recovery paths from a big financial 
recession on years 2 and 5. It can be seen in Table 1.8 that from the second year of 
recovery, the accrued growth is significantly pushed upwards. This results goes 
against the argument that debt overhang help to explain slow recoveries.  
 
Table 1.8 Regression results: Interactions with credit excess from peak 
VARIABLES Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
      
Small*Credit Excess 
-0.0138 0.150 0.0466 -0.0942 -0.123 
(0.105) (0.166) (0.174) (0.199) (0.259) 
Big*Credit Excess 
0.379 0.439 0.663 0.451 0.744 
(0.242) (0.346) (0.472) (0.598) (0.631) 
Financial*Credit Excess 
0.158 1.010** 1.164 1.339* 1.450*** 
(0.204) (0.380) (0.680) (0.760) (0.471) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Therefore, we can conclude that excessive debt accumulation during the expansion 
preceding a recession. Help to explain the magnitude of the output loss, especially 
for big non-financial recessions. On the other hand, I did not find statistical evidence 
supporting the claim that debt overhang is associated with slower recoveries. 
Therefore, the analysis made in this paper only supports a positive effect of the 
magnitude of recessions on the speed of recovery. This finding is analysed in the next 
section when comparing it with what a standard business cycle model implies. 
 
1.7 SIZE EFFECT REVISITED 
 
The analysis presented in this paper showed that the financial nature of the recession 
and the debt over hang seem not to be associated with growth rates variability during 
recoveries. In fact, the size of the recession is the only factor playing a statistically 
significant role. Contrary to what some authors suggest (v.g. Romer & Romer, 2015), 
big recessions are not associated with sluggish recoveries, but with faster growth 
Essays on Financial Crises 24 
rates during the recovery phase. This implies that the size of the shock is not 
positively correlated with persistence of the recession. 
In a similar way to Romer and Romer (2015), Stock and Watson (2012) concluded that 
the 2007-2009 recession in the US was the product of bigger and more persistent 
shocks. Both of these studies suggest a positive relationship between size and 
persistence of the recessions. Moreover, they conclude that the mechanisms of the 
crisis plays no or a limited role determining the magnitude and persistence of a 
recession.  
Assuming that those authors are right and the size of the recession is associated with 
a higher persistence, then a simple DSGE model should be enough to recreate small 
and big recessions. More importantly, It should be enough to generate big recessions 
that are at the same time more persistent.  
I test in this section whether theory supports the findings in this paper or the 
suggested positive association between persistence and size of the recession 
supported by the aforementioned literature. To do so, I use simulated series from a 
typical RBC model (King & Rebelo, 1999) and then I estimate the typical recession 
and recovery paths conditional on the size of the recession.  
To make comparable the results from this Monte Carlo experiment with the results 
obtained from the data presented previously, I use the same calibration as in King 
and Rebelo (1999) and add a trend to the stationary data obtained from the simulation. 
Then, I add 4 consecutive data points to form an annual observation. Finally, as 
before I identify turning points using the Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm and 
estimate the impulse responses by local projections methods (Jordà, 2005). 
Additionally, the error bands are computed as the by-result of estimations for 10,000 
rounds of simulations. 
The results reported in Figure 1.10 look overwhelmingly similar to those obtained 
from the estimation of equation 1 using empirical data. A typical big recession has 
two consecutive years of negative growth, 1 more than an average small recession. 
Additionally, the characteristic growth path during the recovery from a big recession 
is not significantly different from the recovery path from a small episode.  
 
Essays on Financial Crises 25 
Figure 1.10 Typical recessions from simulated data 
AR(1) plus trend RBC first order 
approximation 
RBC second order 
approximation 
   
Notes: Error bands at 95% of significance. 
 
The previous result might have nothing to do with the fitness of the RBC model. As 
seen in Figure 1.10, when replicating the exercise for a typical AR(1) process plus 
trend we obtained very similar results to the ones obtained with a linear 
approximation of the RBC model. A bigger shock produces a deeper initial fall in 
output. What the non-linearities of the model are adding is the amplification of the 
shock to the second year.  
This means that even in theoretical models the size and persistence of the shocks are 
not enough to explain the business cycle dynamics. Amplification and transmission 
mechanisms are important to determine the effect of the shock in a DSGE model. In 
the case of a standard RBC model, the amplification mechanisms (general 
equilibrium dynamics and non-linearities) help to determine the duration of the 
recession (the number of periods with negative growth). 
Therefore, some economic mechanisms should be explaining both deep recession 
and slow recoveries (apart from the description of the data as an AR processes). 
Popular mechanisms are financial frictions and policy shocks. The former may 
produce credit crunches during the recovery affecting investment dynamics, while 
the latter may affect output growth if government are restricted in  the use of policy 
instruments, for instance by a fiscal consolidation programme or a zero lower bound 
(Gali, et al., 2012). Evaluating these explanation is out of the scope of the purpose of 
this essay. It is lead for future research to evaluate empirically what factors –apart 
from the ones evaluated in the previous sections of the paper– might explain slower 
recoveries and whether theoretical models account for them.  
 
 
Essays on Financial Crises 26 
1.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, I test the views that big recessions and slow recoveries are the 
consequence of the financial nature of the crises or the by-product of bigger and more 
persistent shocks. To do so, I estimate by local projections the recession and recovery 
paths conditional on size and financial nature of the crisis using annual data for 17 
countries (Jordà, et al., 2017). 
The evidence presented here allows to conclude that financial recessions are more 
painful than normal recessions conditional on them being big enough. Furthermore, 
it can also be concluded that the severity of the recession is, if something, associated 
with faster growth during recoveries. Besides, recoveries from financial crises are not 
significantly slower in general. 
On the other hand, the claim that deep recessions and slow recoveries are the by-
product of bigger and more persistent shocks (Romer and Romer, 2015; Stock and 
Watson, 2012) is an incomplete answer. Using simulated data from a simple RBC 
model, I concluded that non-linearities play a role determining the magnitude and 
duration of a recession. Therefore, other factors such as rigidities and frictions may 
be responsible for the recession magnitude and the sluggishness of the recovery. 
The role of debt run-ups was also evaluated. The evidence confirms partly Jordà et 
al. (2013) finding that debt accumulation play a role determining the magnitude of 
the recession. Notwithstanding, the statistical evidence does not support that debt 
over-hang plays a role determining growth during recoveries. Further research is 
needed to unveil additional factors explaining both big recessions and slow 
recoveries. 
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1.9 APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
I use the Macro Financial data base gathered by Oscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and 
Alan M. Taylor (2017) (JST from now on). For comparability with Jordà et al (2013), I 
use the same variables they used in their full model. This is, the real per capita GDP, 
consumption per capita, investment to GDP ratio, total loans, population, price index, 
current account and the systemic financial crises identifier. The data is available for 
the following 17 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States of America.  
 
Systemic financial crisis variable. 
To begin with, the financial crises dummy was build using previous literature results. 
In particular, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Bordo et al. (2001) were used for most 
of the episodes and countries. These two references are the main contributors to the 
financial crisis dummy and therefore the definitions they use for systemic financial 
crises are worth to mention. For Bordo et al. (2001) a financial crisis is an episode of 
“financial-market volatility marked by significant problems of illiquidity and 
insolvency among financial-market participants and/or by official intervention to 
contain such consequences” (Bordo et al. 2001, pp 55).  
Notwithstanding the definition of systemic financial crisis used by the authors is the 
one reported in Laeven and Valencia (2008). That is, a financial crises are “events 
during which a country’s banking sector experiences bank runs, sharp increases in 
default rates accompanied by large losses of capital that result in public intervention, 
bankruptcy, or the forced merger of major financial institutions” (Jordà et al., 2010, 
pp. 5). According to this, the financial crisis variable takes a value of one if in a given 
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Real per capita GDP 
The real per capita GDP is an index using 2005 as base year. This is a spliced series 
that relies on Barro and Ursua (2010) data base for the 1970-2004 period. Form 2005 
onwards the series is completed using growth rates from the World Bank. 
 
Real Consumption per capita 
This is an index with 2006 as base year. As with the real per capita GDP, the main 
source for this information is the series collected by Barro and Ursua (2010) for the 
period 1901-2009. From 2010 onwards the series is completed using the World Bank 
Data on household final consumption expenditure per capita (constant 2005 US$, 
Chain linked). 
 
Investment to GDP ratio 
This is also a spliced series. Depending on the country the sources change. Although 
multiple sources are used, JST (2017) have tried to improve the robustness of the 
series by replacing multisource data on Nominal Gross Capital Formation with data 
form the IMF – International Financial Statistics for the post-WWII period. The 
investment ratio is then constructed by dividing the nominal gross capital formation 
by the nominal GDP. The latter is also a multisource data series that relies on the IMF 
– International Financial Statistics for the post-WWII period. 
 
Total Loans 
This variable refers to the total loans to non-financial private sector expressed in 
nominal terms in local currency. It is used to build the total loans to GDP ratio using 
the nominal GDP, as described before. This ratio is used to build the variable credit 
excess, which is defined as the deviation in percentage points from the historical 
average of the total loans to GDP ratio by phases of financial development as defined 
in Jordà et al. (2013). 
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The sources for the total loans are diverse among countries and depending on the 
case are completed using data form the IMF – IFS. For more information check the 
documentation of the JST (2017) database. 
 
Population 
The population is a series taken from the Angus Madison Database (2008), Historical 
statistics of the world economy, for the period 1870 – 2009. It is completed with data 
on population growth form the IMF for the period 2009 – 2013. When the data was 
not available for a specific country in the main database it was completed with 
information form alternative sources. A special case is Finland, where the whole 
series (1870 – 2013) was taken from Statistics Findland (2016). 
 
Price index 
It is a collection of consumer price indexes with base year 1990. For most of the 
countries the series is based on A. Taylor (2002) A Century of Purchasing–Power 
Parity, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 84(1), p139–150. The series is 




Finally, the current account is a nominal, local currency series. It is used to compute 
the current account to GDP ratio, using the nominal GDP series as described before. 
The series is constructed from multiple sources. For more details check Jordà et al. 
(2017). 
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The US subprime crisis was followed by a long and deep recession, much deeper and 
longer than any previous post-war US recession. At the same time, European Union 
countries suffered a combination of banking and government debt crises that caused 
large drops in employment and GDP.8 These episodes proved false the idea that big 
financial and economic crises are exclusive to developing and emerging economies 
in which capital and financial markets are less efficient. It also underscored the fact 
that economic downturns that are accompanied by financial crises seem to be bigger 
and more persistent than other economic crises, and they are usually accompanied 
by persistent falls in asset prices and an explosive trend in government debt. (e.g. 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Cerra and Saxena, 2008)  
Additionally, it seems that pre-crisis debt growth plays a role not only in feeding the 
risk of financial crisis, but also as a determinant of the magnitude of the recession 
(e.g. Hong and Tornell, 2005; Jorda et. al, 2013). Dell’Ariccia et al (2008) and Kannan 
(2012) found evidence in this direction using firm level data, while Berkmen et al 
(2012) found that developing countries with a highly leveraged financial system, a 
rapid growth in credit and a preference for short term debt tend to experience 
stronger impacts of financial crises on growth. In the same spirit, there is evidence 
suggesting that when asset bubbles are fuelled by credit booms, the recessions that 
follow tend to be longer and deeper (Jorda et al., 2015).  
On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that output expectations prior to the 
crisis play an important role in determining the dynamics of the economy and 
explaining the financial crisis (Chauvet and Guo, 2003, and Cerra and Saxena, 2008). 
                                                     
 
8 Real GDP growth rates in 2009 for the Euro Area and the USA were -3.77% and -2.78%, 
according to the IMF data. Unemployment rates were above 8% in the USA during the period 
2009-2012. Euro zone unemployment rallied from 7.58% in 2008 to 12.2% in 2013. 
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These findings are all consistent with the idea that the pre-crisis dynamics are 
important in determining the severity and persistence of recessions. 
In this paper, I use unrealised news to model optimism in an otherwise standard 
DSGE model. This allows the pre-crisis dynamics to be related to the downturn 
dynamics. At the same time, comparisons of the effect of news about different shocks 
are done to to evaluate the idea that financial crises are associated with deeper 
recessions and slower recoveries (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009) due to some differential 
characteristics of these episodes.   
The financial frictions literature has taught us that these frictions are an important 
amplification and propagation mechanism (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler ,1989). Within 
this framework, crisis experiments have been modelled as negative shocks on 
technology (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), net worth (e.g. Bernanke et al, 1999), and 
deleveraging shocks (e.g. Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012) among others. This 
literature has brought a better understanding of the link between macroeconomic 
and financial variables. Notwithstanding, important features of the economy and of 
the mechanisms behind the crisis might be missing. This is because negative 
exogenous and/or idiosyncratic shocks are usually blamed for the occurrence of 
economic downturns. In this way, pre-crisis economic dynamics have been neglected 
in standard economic DSGE models.  
Conversely, the approach used in this paper accounts for the importance of the 
correlation between optimistic expectations, debt run-ups and the occurrence of deep 
and persistent downturns. I show here a model where the pre-crisis behaviour and 
the bust that follows are generated by optimistic expectations about future 
investment returns. To do so, I introduce news to an otherwise standard DSGE 
framework with financial frictions as presented by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). 
Financial optimism is modelled as unconfirmed news about capital returns, that if 
unjustified (ex-post) leads to a deleveraging process, an asset price bust and a 
financial crisis. An advantage of this framework is the fact that shocks to capital 
returns affect financial intermediaries more directly than typical TFP shocks. This 
allows me to distinguish between a “financial” and a traditional technology shock.  
The modelled behaviour is similar to Keynes’ (1936) “animal spirits”, Pigou’s (1927) 
waves of optimism and Minsky’s (1977) financial instability hypothesis. . If people 
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believe that an investment project is going to be profitable (and that the risk is 
acceptable), then they are willing to invest in that project. Entrepreneurs take on debt 
and a boom of debt and investment takes place. This also leads to a rise in asset prices. 
A crisis occurs when the expectations about future high returns on investment 
(capital value) turn out to be false In this case, returns on investment are not enough 
to service the debt. At the same time, asset prices go down, reflecting the actual 
productivity of capital and consequently, fire sales of assets need to take place to pay 
the debt. This leads to an investment drop and a decline in output and net worth. 
This is a debt – deflation process a la Fisher (1933). Debt burden jointly with financial 
frictions implies that investment is delayed further, making recessions more 
persistent.  
In this way, agents can affect the returns of their own investments and their balance 
sheets by accumulating capital and debt beyond what is optimal, due to optimism. 
This idea has been incorporated to some extent in models that use expectations as 
endogenous drivers of stock price collapses (e.g. Branch and Evans, 2011; Williams, 
2012).  
More generally this chapter is related to literature claiming that expectations can 
drive the business cycle. This include the adaptive learning, the sunspots cycles 
literature and the news driven cycles literature. In the former, agents have bounded 
rationality and behave like econometricians trying to forecast the future. They could 
or could not know the exact structure of the economy and they are gradually learning 
about the economic environment. Mitra et al (2013), Eusepi and Preston (2011), 
Williams (2003), Milani (2007, 2011) and Cellarier (2006, 2008) among others have 
used adaptive learning to explain the role of expectations as drivers of the business 
cycles and have concluded that under this framework endogenous economic 
fluctuations can arise.  In the same spirit Branch and Evans (2011) showed that least 
squared learning is capable to generate endogenous booms and bust in asset prices 
as a response to changes in the fundamentals. Also Williams (2012) using a similar 
framework showed that changes in beliefs can generate asset prices cycles but in his 
model portfolio choice matter and a flight to quality happens as a result of correction 
on expectations.  
Essays on Financial Crises 33 
The literature on sunspot cycles arising from financial frictions, or rational bubbles, 
is also related to this work. In this literature, multiple equilibria exist. Sunspot shocks 
lead the economy from a good state to a bad state and a crisis occurs. A bubble occurs 
when the market price of an asset and the value of its fundamentals differ. The 
bubbly state exists as a consequence of financial frictions (for a full review of this 
literature see Benhabib and Farmer, 1999; Hamilton, 2016; and  Martin and Ventura, 
2018).  In the rational bubble literature, there is a positive wealth effect of the bubble 
(e.g. Martin and Ventura, 2012) instability arise because the bubble can burst. 
Recently, Kunieda and Shibata (2016) propose a combination of two policies to 
prevent self-fulfilling financial crisis while taking advantage of the positive wealth 
effect of the bubble. 
Within the rational expectations framework it has been shown that signals about 
future changes in some variables such as technological progress can cause cyclical 
movements due to people’s tendency to speculate about future economic 
environment (Beaudry and Portier, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2013). According to the news 
view busts are rare events that only occur if optimistic news about the future of the 
economy turn out to be wrong (Beaudry and Portier 2013). Information shocks can 
generate cyclical movements only in a multi-sector framework (Beaudry and Portier, 
2004 and 2007) and investment – liquidation cycles and asset prices booms and bust 
arise because of taking false information as true. Once the fault in information is 
unveiled adjustment take place.  
Dispersed information can be modeled under this framework as in Lorenzoni (2009) 
where market niches are introduced through the figure of islands. Agents consuming 
and producing in each island cannot estimate accurately the economy fundamentals 
due, among other factors, to the presence of multiple island specific shocks and the 
inability to observe the aggregated shocks on the economy. More recently, using this 
framework Gunn and Johri (2013) analyzed the effects of news about technology 
progress on banking and Gomes and Medicino (2012) introduce news as drivers of 
housing prices bubbles and busts. 
The model presented here is strongly related with Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and 
Gertler and Karadi (2011). The main difference with respect with these two has to do 
with what they have called the crisis experiment. The former is a typical financial 
frictions model where a crisis occurs in response to a negative shock to capital quality.  
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The latter define a crisis experiment as a negative news shock where the adjustment 
process is smoothen by modifying the probability assigned to the bad event 
happening.  In the model presented in this chapter a crisis occurs when good news 
about capital quality are not realized and the adjustment process needs to take place 
immediately. 
Secondly, While Gertler and Karadi (2011) studied the effects of waves of pessimism, 
I studied the possibility that pre-crisis dynamics as well as the downturn 
accompanied by the crisis could occur because of optimistic expectations. A 
difference with previous literature about expectations driven financial crises is that I 
compare the responses to technological and financial news, concluding that only 
financial news can produce a financial crisis (as defined in this chapter). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 2 I presented a simplified 
model as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) which includes a private banking sector 
where financial frictions arise endogenously, as a consequence of the incentive to 
deviate resources for their own use. Unlike Gunn and Johri’s (2013) work, news about 
capital value, rather than the efficiency of the banking sector, drive the business 
cycles. It is also closely related to Gertler and Karali (2010) but unlike them, I do not 
restrict the way the economy adjusts to unrealised news. 
In section 3 the calibration of the model is presented and a crisis experiment is 
defined. The results of this experiment are analysed in section 4. I found that 
optimistic news about future returns on capital lead to an excessive accumulation of 
debt and capital and, subsequently, to a boom in output. Once agents realise they 
were wrong, they need to liquidate capital to pay back the debt, but now the price of 
capital is much lower and they need to fire sale assets. This is a distinguishing feature 
of the model compared with Gunn and Johris’s (2013).  
In section 5, I compare cycles driven by financial and technology optimism. I found 
that the latter are not accompanied by asset price booms nor by an improvement in 
banks net worth during the expansion. This also implies bigger adjustments in these 
variables once people learn the truth about capital returns. I also found that financial 
crises are accompanied by stronger debt cycles. Some robustness checks are 
presented in section 6. Finally, some conclusions are presented in the last section. 
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2.2 OPTIMISM AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
To represent an economy where animal spirits play an important role – not only 
causing a financial crisis, but also amplifying and magnifying shocks – I introduce 
news, or anticipated shocks, on investment returns (or assets value). Agents cannot 
tell whether the information is accurate, and their behaviour following the news 
generates booms in asset prices and build-ups of debt. When the news turn out to be 
wrong, they are followed by asset prices busts, deleveraging processes and long 
lasting recessions.  
I modify the simplest version of the financial intermediation model by Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010). This is the case of a frictionless interbank market such that the only 
financial friction is related to the inability of the depositors to enforce the repayment 
of their “loans” to the banks. A banker has incentives to divert funds raised through 
deposits to personal uses. If she does that, then the bank defaults on its debt and it 
shuts down. The model is described in the following sub section. 
 
2.2.1 The model  
 
The economy is populated by a continuum of households whose members can either 
be bankers or workers. Banks raise deposits form households and make loans to the 
goods producers. There are two types of producers: capital goods producers that 
operate under perfect competition, and goods producers of size 1. The behaviour of 
these economic units is described next. 
 
2.2.1.1 Goods producers: 
 
Firms operate under perfect competition in a national market and face a Coob-
Douglas technology as follows: 
(1)  𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐹(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡) = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼  
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They receive funding for their investment projects from the banks in the form of state 
dependent securities that pay returns 𝑍𝑡. Firms buy capital goods (K) from capital 
goods producers at the price Q and hire labour (L) from families at an hourly wage 
W.  
Optimization conditions are standard. Therefore, wages and returns per unit of 
capital are respectively given by: 
(2) 
 




















Capital accumulation equation is given by: 
(4)  𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝛹𝑡+1[𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡]  
 
A shock to the capital quality (𝛹𝑡+1) is interpreted here as a capital productivity shock 
or, more precisely, as a capital value shock. This would have indirect effects on the 
marginal productivities through a channel similar to a scale effect. 
 
 
2.2.1.2 Capital goods producers: 
 
Meanwhile, capital goods producers sell capital goods at the price Q to goods 
producers and they face convex adjustment costs of investment so that their 














The adjustment cost function has the following properties: 𝑓(1) = 𝑓′(1) = 0  and 
𝑓′′(∙) > 0 ; and 𝜆 is the households’ Lagrange multiplier associated to its budget 
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constraint. The optimality condition for them is given by equation 5 and it implies 
that in steady state the price of capital goods needs to be 1. 
(5) 
 

























The representative household is composed by a continuum of members of size 1. It 
is formed by f bankers and (1-f) workers. There is perfect consumption insurance 
within the household which implies that the consumption is the same irrespective of 














Households choose their demand for consumption goods and their supply of hours 
worked subject to a budget constraint that includes transfers to and from financial 
and non-financial firms. Bankers transfer non-negative dividends to the families 
given their flow of funds constraint, and workers supply labour and transfer wage 
income to the families. The only asset households can hold are bank deposits. They 
receive the riskless gross interest rate R in exchange for their deposits. Therefore, the 
representative household budget constraint is given by: 
(6) 𝐷𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝛱𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡  
Here D is the quantity of bank deposits holdings and 𝛱 are the net transfers from 
firms and banks. Deposits might be interpreted as one period maturity bonds. Given 










𝑅𝑡+1 = 1 
 
 








Notice that 𝜆 here represents the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to current 
consumption. If the habit formation parameter (𝜁) is set to zero we go back to the case 




Financial intermediaries are modelled as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Following 
them, a proportion (1 − 𝜎) of banks randomly exits the market every period. This 
prevents bankers from overcoming financial constraints by retaining earning. Exiting 
banks need to transfer any retained earnings to households and become workers. For 
simplicity, the number of banks is constant, therefore each period randomly (1 − 𝜎)𝑓 
workers become bankers. 
Banks raise deposits (𝐷𝑡) form households at the beginning of each period, they agree 
to pay an interest rate 𝑅𝑡+1. Later they learn the level of investment and make loans 
to goods producers in the form of state contingent securities. These securities pay a 




𝑍𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡
  
A representative bank maximises the discounted sum of future net worth subject to 
the flow of funds constraint as follows: 









(11) 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 = 𝑁 + 𝐷𝑡  
Where the net worth of an individual bank (N) is defined as: 
𝑁𝑡 = [𝑍𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑡]𝛹𝑡𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡−1 
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Financial friction:  
Bankers have incentives to transfer funds to their families. Divertible funds for an 
individual bank will be equal to 𝜃𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡. Diversion of funds will result in default and 
bankruptcy will occur. In this event, creditors would be able to reclaim the remaining 
(1 − 𝜃)𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 funds.  
To prevent banks from transferring funds to their families the following incentive 
constraint needs to hold always: 
𝑉𝑡(𝑆𝑡,  𝐷𝑡) ≥  𝜃𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 
Where 𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡,  𝑑𝑡) is the maximized value of the value function.  
Banks choose 𝑆𝑡 and 𝐷𝑡 at the beginning of period t, before aggregate uncertainty is 
realized (because they choose to divert funds between periods). Therefore, their 
maximization problem can be summarized by the following Bellman equation: 
𝑉𝑡−1(𝑆𝑡−1,  𝐷𝑡−1) = 𝐸𝑡−1𝛬𝑡−1,𝑡 {(1 − 𝜎)𝑁𝑡 + 𝜎 max
𝑑𝑡, 𝑠𝑡
𝑉𝑡(𝑆𝑡,  𝐷𝑡)} 
To solve this problem we need to guess the linear form for the value function, where 
Υst and Υt are time varying parameters, representing the banks’ marginal valuation 
of securities and deposits (debt). 
𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡,  𝑑𝑡) = Υst𝑆𝑡 − Υt𝐷𝑡 
The maximization of the value function subject to the incentive constraint implies a 
restriction on the amount of credit a bank can supply, in other words, it limits their 
ability to buy securities such that: 
(12) 
 
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 = 𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑡 
 
 









− Υ𝑡 > 0 
Essays on Financial Crises 40 
μ𝑡  represents the marginal excess valuation of securities over deposits, such that 
when it rises, the securities valuation gets higher. 
Conditions on Υt and 𝜇t for the value function to be linear9 complete the optimization 
conditions of the banks as follows: 
(13) Υ𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡Λ𝑡,𝑡+1Ω𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1  
(14) 𝜇𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1𝛺𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1)  
With: 
Ω𝑡+1 = 1 − 𝜎 + 𝜎(Υ𝑡+1 + 𝜙𝑡+1μ𝑡+1) 
Where Ω𝑡+1 is the stochastic marginal value of net worth.  
Notice that when financial frictions are absent, the banks’ optimization conditions 
are reduced to the equality of the expected returns on securities and the current 
deposits interest rate. Therefore, when 𝜃 = 0 the model is equivalent to a RBC model 




In the aggregate, banks’ net worth is the sum of existing surviving and entering banks’ 
net worth. The latter receive transfers from the families equal to a proportion 𝜉 of the 
total value of aggregated banks’ assets.  Which imply the following aggregate net 
worth equation for any particular period. 
(15) 
 
𝑁𝑡 = [𝑍𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑡](𝜎 + 𝜉)𝛹𝑡𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝜎𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡−1 
 
 
Where S and D stand for aggregated securities holdings and aggregate deposits, 
respectively.  
                                                     
 
9 This conditions are implied by the Value function iterations. 
Essays on Financial Crises 41 
Equilibrium in goods market, retail credit market (deposits market), and securities 
market (loans to firms) imply the following: 
(16) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + [1 + 𝑓 (
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
)] 𝐼𝑡  
(17) 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡  
(18) 𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡  
This equilibrium conditions plus all the numbered equations complete the system of 




Optimism is introduced though news shocks as in Christiano et al. (2008). The 
stochastic process for 𝛹𝑡 then is given by: 
(19) 𝛹𝑡 = 𝜌𝛹𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡−𝑝  
Where εt  and ξt−p  are i.i.d. non-correlated shocks and 𝜉𝑡−𝑝  is the news shock. In 
period t-p, people received news about capital quality in period t, but they cannot 
tell whether it is true or false. When news turns out to be false, a boom followed by 
a “financial” crisis occurs. Notice that here the news shock is not modelled as a signal 
extraction problem. If it were modelled in that way, the qualitative responses of the 
model to the news shock wouldn’t be different.  
 
2.3 CALIBRATION AND CRISIS EXPERIMENT 
 
To perform some simulations and analyse the effects of optimism, as defined in the 
previous section, numerical values are assigned to all the parameters of the model. 
The discount factor is set to 0.99, a very standard parameterisation that implies a 
deposit annualised interest rate of around 4.1% in steady state. Following Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010) I set a high value for the Frish labour elasticity to compensate for the 
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lack of labour market frictions10. Given this parameter, the weight of labour in utility 
(𝜒) is calibrated to match labour supply in steady state equal to 0.2381. Assuming that 
workers are endowed with one unit of time, this implies that a representative worker 
works 40 hours a week.  
Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) the survival rate of banks is set to 0.972 
implying an average bank’s life of 10 years, and 𝜃 and 𝜉 are set to match steady state 
target values for the leverage ratio (𝜙) of 4 and the interest rate spread (𝑅𝑘 − 𝑅) of 19 
basis points. The later is equivalent to assuming an 1% annual spread and it is 
consistent with the average historical spread between US commercial papers and US 
T-bill rates, and between US mortgage and long term US government bonds rates.11  
With respect to capital producers, I assumed a quadratic investment adjustment cost 
function. This formulation looks simplistic, but other functional forms that fulfil the 
requirements reported in the last section do not produce qualitatively different 
results. 
Finally, the calibration strategy also looks for generating macroeconomic co-
movement. This is consistent with evidence (Görtz et al., 2016) supporting positive 
co-movement between output, consumption, and hours, and reductions in credit 
spreads in response to TFP news. These findings suggest than in a model of financial 
frictions it is important to have co-movement to news shocks plus positive initial 
effects on consumption. 
Although, Barsky and Sims (2011) found contrasting evidence using a VAR 
estimation strategy for an RBC model. It has been found that their results are due in 
part to the use of an outdated database that suffers from a noisy series of utilization 
adjusted TFP (Kurmann and Sims 2017). Also, the differences between them and other 
studies could be due to subsample instability, since their results depend on the 
forecast horizons (Beaudry et al, 2012). 
                                                     
 
10 The results are robust to a more standard calibration of this parameter. 
11 This is easily verifiable by computing the arithmetic average of the spread using the data 
available through FRED. 
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In this chapter, a financial crisis is defined as an episode where an expansion is 
characterised by debt run-ups and growth in output, consumption and investment; 
while a recession is defined as a loss in output, employment and a considerable 
reduction in investment accompanied by a fall in asset prices. This goes in line with 
empirical evidence that shows that the recession of 2008 was characterized by a 
deleveraging process increased financial frictions, high unemployment, depressed 
GDP, low investment and household consumption (Hall, 2012). Then if a recession 
like this, can be caused by financial news, they should generate macroeconomic co-
movement. 
An alternative to get co-movement that is widely accepted in the news literature is to 
modify the preferences such that the wealth effect is low. This is complimented with 
investment adjustment cost and variable capital utilization as in Jaimovich and 
Rebelo (2009).12 I did not use this alternative since within this framework you need 
to use a very restrictive parameterisation to get co-movement in response to both, 
news on the capital quality and the technology shocks13.  In particular, the Jaimovich 
and Rebelo (2009) setting turns out to be problematic when getting co-movement in 
response to capital quality news shocks, since it requires setting the elasticity of 
labour supply to infinity with logarithmic utility or setting the risk parameter to at 
least 1.2 (non log utility function) and a very high elasticity of labour and investment 
adjustment cost parameters.  
Instead of departing from the Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) setting, I prefer to set 
investment adjustment cost and habit formation parameters high enough to produce 
co-movement between employment, investment and consumption as in (Christiano, 
et al., 2008). Then, the habit formation parameter is set to 0.9 and the marginal 
adjustment cost is set to 30 times the percentage increase in investment. All the 
parameters’ values are presented in Table 2.1.  
 
                                                     
 
12 For a comprehensive review of the alternative ways to deal with the co-movement puzzle 
view Wang (2012). 
13 See the appendix for a parameterization that generates co-movement in an RBC model. 
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Table 2.1. Calibration: Baseline model 
Households   
L 0.2381 Labour supply in steady state 
 0.9900 Discount rate 
𝜻 0.9000 Habit parameter 
 4.5565 Relative utility weight of labour 
 0.1000 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
Financial intermediaries 
  
𝑹𝒌 − 𝑹 0.0019 Steady state spread 
 4.0000 Leverage ratio in steady state 
 0.3409 Fraction of divertible assets  
 0.0027 Transfer to entering bankers 
 0.972 Survival rate of the bankers 
Adjustment costs   
f’(1) 30 Marginal adjustment cost 
Intermediate good firms 
  
 0.330 Effective capital share 
 0.025 Depreciation rate 
Stochastic Process 
  
𝝆 0.660 Autoregressive capital quality parameter 
 
In the next section I present the responses of the model to news about an increase in 
the value of capital eight periods ahead. The anticipation of the shock leads agents to 
try to accumulate capital before the shock is realised. The most interesting dynamics 
are observed when the shock 𝜉𝑡−𝑝 is not realised. This is a crisis experiment, in the 
sense that all the decisions made based on the anticipation of the shock need to be 
corrected. The accumulation of capital and debt turn out to be excessive, once agents 
learn that the news was wrong. It would become clear that this dynamics creates a 
debt-investment cycle accompanied by asset liquidation and a recession. 
2.4 RESULTS: 
 
The analysis of two different settings is reported in the following pages. In both 
scenarios agents in the economy received news in period one about an increase of 1% 
in the value of capital eight periods later (i.e. in period nine). This can be interpreted 
as an increase in either the capital productivity or in the effective units of capital. In 
the first scenario the shock is realised in period 9, so that decisions made in 
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anticipation turn out to be optimal ex-post. Conversely, in the second setting the 
shock is not realised and these decisions become sub-optimal ex-post. 
Figure 2.1 Responses to an 8 periods anticipated 1% increase in capital quality  
 
Notes: Baseline (Solid Line) and RBC (dashed line). 
All variables in log-deviations from steady state except for expected returns. 
 
To begin with, the effects of the news shock in the first scenario are represented by 
the impulse response functions reported in Figure 2.1. Dashed lines account for the 
responses to the news shock in the model without financial frictions, and solid lines 
represent the full model responses (“baseline” in what follows).  
As can be seen in the graph, financial frictions did not play a major role in the 
qualitative responses of all the real variables, the asset prices and the expected 
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returns. Quantitatively, the model with financial frictions implies stronger increases 
in output, investment, employment and asset prices in anticipation of the realizations 
of the shock. In the absence of financial frictions, banks’ optimization implies that net 
worth needs to remain at zero such that returns on securities are transferred to 
depositors when interests are paid. This implies that banks use all their deposits to 
buy securities. 
In the baseline model, following the good news about the future, banks demand for 
securities, capital stock and households’ deposits increase gradually. The positive 
forecast about future returns leads to an increase in the price of securities, which 
drives banks’ net worth upwards. At the same time, thanks to the increase in 
investment and employment, a boom in production is generated. Consumption also 
increases, thanks to the strong habit formation. 
Unlike an unanticipated shock, people start investing before the shock is realized, 
reaching the desired level of capital before-hand. This is an increase in savings 
decisions in response to the perspective of having higher future returns. Also, the 
effect of the shock on several variables, including capital stock, securities, and 
employment is rather gradual. This could imply lower financial cost for the banks 
(compared with a counter factual onetime purchase), since they spread their demand 
for securities across a longer period of time.  
On the verge of the realization of the shock, expected returns increase strongly and 
investment slows down. Once the increase in capital quality is realized, investment 
keeps slowing down and the value of capital (or the effective units of capital) 
increases. This is equivalent to saying that the capital became more productive and, 
as a consequence, “effective” units of capital keep increasing even when investment 
is below its steady state level. In terms of the model, the capital is multiplied by the 
quality shock increasing in size. Then, less investment is required to keep the capital 
growing. After some time, capital starts to adjust back to its steady state level. 
Regarding employment, motivated by the higher desire to save – invest in 
anticipation of the shock, households decide to increase their labour supply to 
accumulate more capital. As a result of higher returns, the initial increase in 
consumption is followed by a bigger and long-lasting increase. The higher future 
consumption implies a downwards shift in the labour supply. This implies that 
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employment falls below the steady state after the shock is realized. This is at least 
partly a consequence of habit formation as point out by Wang (2012). 
Concerning production, it increases initially due to capital and labour growth. After 
the shock is realized a small additional increase in output occurs as capital 
productivity increases with the shock. Since employment is reduced, output growth 
also reduces until it returns to its steady state level.  
As investment increases, the demand for securities and capital goods goes up and, 
therefore, the price of capital goods increases as well. It starts to decline before the 
shock is realized, but once it is realized, after the sudden fall in investment, the price 
falls further, going below its steady state level. Afterwards, the capital goods price 
adjusts back, slowly converging towards the steady state level. This fluctuation of 
asset prices is not strong enough to produce a strong deterioration in the aggregate 
banks’ net worth. 
Since households want to save more in anticipation of the news about capital returns, 
deposits (banks’ debt) increase gradually and leverage starts to increase 
consequently. Once the shock is realized the debt increases further, then it is 
gradually paid back. This is equivalent to saying that people are not liquidating 
assets or creditors are not demanding anticipated payments, due to the higher 
returns on investment. Alternatively, if we consider debt as one period contracts that 
can be rolled over, then this can be interpreted as the creditors being willing to 
continue financing banks.  
 
 
2.4.1 A crisis produced by optimism 
 
Regarding the case when news turns out to be false (Figure 2.2), once people learned 
their mistake they make big adjustments in their investment decisions. This is 
reflected in a strong reduction in investment. This adjustment happens in a sudden 
and people start to withdraw their deposits. Because the productivity boost did not 
happen, capital do not gain value but instead starts to decrease until the liquidation 
is enough to pay back the debt.  
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Figure 2.2 Responses to optimistic news 1% increase in capital quality 
 
Notes: Baseline (Solid Line) and RBC (dashed line). 
            All variables in log-deviations from steady state except for expected returns. 
 
This over-liquidation of assets is the result of financial constraints combined with 
debt burden. Since banks need to pay back the creditors, but the returns on capital 
are lower than expected, they need to liquidate capital. However, now the asset 
prices have plummeted and then the liquidation occurs at fire sale prices implying 
that more capital needs to be liquidated. Once banks have paid back all their 
excessive debt, they can accumulate capital again and it slowly comes back to the 
steady state level. 
The rational for fire sales is twofold: firstly, the bust in asset prices and secondly, the 
deleveraging process that results from the inability to get additional funds due to the 
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financial constraints. There is a double causation between the liquidation and asset’s 
prices. The latter falls due to the reduction in investment and capital that happens 
once the shock is not realised, and the former gets bigger as the prices plummet.  
As a consequence of the assets liquidation and prices bust, banks´ net worth falls 
dramatically, up to almost 10% below the steady state. This adds to the vicious circle 
of low investment, low asset prices, low banks capacity to buy securities and to fund 
firms, and fire sales. 
Given the sudden reduction in employment and the strong fall in capital, the product 
falls too, generating a long-lasting recession. This recession is matched with 
reductions in consumption growth and investment, along with a deleveraging 
process and a deterioration of banks’ balance sheets.  
To sum up, the news shock in the baseline model can generate the debt accumulation, 
asset prices boom, and output boom prior to a crisis, as well as the bust in asset prices, 
the deleveraging process and the long-lasting recession that characterize financial 
crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009).  
 
2.4.2 The role of financial frictions 
 
The dotted lines in Figure 2.2 represent the responses of the model without financial 
frictions to unrealised news about an 1% increase in capital quality. It can be noted 
that the volatility in asset prices is negligible compared to the baseline scenario. The 
ability to get funding, plus the mild fall in asset prices rule out the fire sales witnessed 
when financial frictions are present.  
As a consequence, once agents learn that the news was wrong, investment, 
consumption, employment and output return gradually to the steady state and a 
recession is avoided. 14  Regarding capital stock, in absence of financial frictions 
liquidation is not necessary and capital slowly adjusts back to its steady state level. 
                                                     
 
14 Notice that the impulse responses should be interpreted as deviations from a balanced 
growth path, and therefore a recession only happens when these functions go below zero. 
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In summary, in this framework unjustified optimism is not able to generate a 
recession in absence of financial constraints. This supports the claim that financial 
frictions are an important transmission mechanism for news shocks (e.g. Görtz et al., 
2016).  
 
2.5 FINANCIAL CRISES AND “NORMAL” RECESSIONS  
 
The capital quality shock used in this paper is a way to introduce exogenous changes 
to the value of capital (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). Changes in the value of capital 
affect directly asset prices and banks’ net worth. This choice was motivated by the 
idea of resembling a financial crisis, where asset prices fall noticeably with 
investment.  
On the other hand, other models have been able to recreate the fall in banks’ net 
worth typical of a financial crisis using different shocks that are not as easily linked 
to investment – debt cycles. For instance, Gunn and Johri (2013) modelled financial 
crises as the result of unrealised news about financial frictions themselves (banks’ 
ability to reclaim debt). This implies that a financial crisis might happen because 
people were over confident about the health of the banking system. But this lets aside 
an explanation of the deterioration of the financial institutions health.  
The capital quality shock has the advantage that it can be interpreted as a shock to 
the returns on investment as well as a financial shock. Then the interpretation of a 
financial crisis occurring because people (including bankers) got over confident 
about investment returns and this caused a bubble in asset prices, is more easily 
justified within this paper’s framework. Also, it is more compelling than assuming 
that the banking system was bad beforehand for an undetermined reason.  
Besides, if the capital quality shock can be interpreted as a financial crisis, as in 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Then, it is worthwhile to check whether the responses to 
news about it are different to some extent to TFP news driven cycles. This would help 
to answer the question whether theory can distinguish between a financial and a non-
financial recession in a model with financial frictions. Empirically, it is possible to 
assess the role of particular shocks to economic volatility and to classify episodes as 
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driven mainly by financial factors or not (v.g. Romer & Romer, 2015 and Stock & 
Watson, 2012) 
To check whether the same qualitative results hold when the model is hit by 
unrealized news about a standard technology shock, I assume the following 
stochastic process for the technology shock. 
(22) 𝐴𝑡 = 𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡−𝑝  
Where νt and ηt−p are i.i.d. non-correlated shocks and 𝜂𝑡−𝑝 represents news about 
technology progress received p periods ahead. The timing is as follows: in period 1 
people receive news about higher TFP to be realised eight periods later. In period 
nine they realise the news was wrong. This setting makes the result comparable to 
our crisis experiment. I am assuming a value of 0.99 for the autoregressive parameter 
(𝜌𝐴). 
Impulse responses to 1% unrealised news shocks about capital quality (dotted line) 
and technology shocks (solid line) are reported in Figure 2.3. Output and 
consumption responses are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar, regardless 
of the nature of the shock. Something similar happens with the response of 
employment.  
Investment and capital stock exhibit different responses to both shocks. The former 
grows more during the anticipation period in response to news about capital quality. 
Nevertheless, investment dynamics does not seem to be significantly different once 
agents learn they were wrong. This implies a similar adjustment in the capital stock, 
and therefore a similar magnitude of the liquidation needed to pay back the debt 
(considering the liquidation as the difference from the peak value to the lowest value). 
The same dynamics could be extrapolated to the volume of securities. 
Nonetheless, contrary to what one could expect, banks’ net worth dynamic responses 
to news about the two shocks are rather different. In particular, during the expansion 
it increases with respect to its steady state in response to news about capital quality, 
while it goes below the steady state in response to technology news.  
These dissimilar responses have to do with the dynamics of asset prices in 
anticipation of the two shocks. News about capital quality leads to an asset price 
boom, since expected returns on capital are expected to increase upon realization of 
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the shock. In practice, agents are expecting that one unit of capital in periods one to 
eight is going to become 1.01 effective units of capital in period nine. Because of the 
assumption of perfect competition in the securities market, the price dynamics reflect 
changes in the discounted expected returns and therefore go up with news about 
higher future capital quality. 
Figure 2.3 Responses to optimistic news in baseline model  
 
Notes: 1% unrealised increases in capital quality (dashed line) and technology (solid line) 
Log-deviations from steady state except for Returns 
 
Since the demand for investment goods grows less, and more gradually, in response 
to technology news, asset prices do not respond in the same way as they do to news 
about capital quality. To understand this better, is necessary to look at the responses 
of expected returns when the news turns out to be true (Appendix 2).  After the shock 
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is realised, expected returns fall below the steady state in response to technology 
news, while they converge gradually to the steady state after capital quality news is 
realised. This implies that, while the TFP shock increases aggregated productivity, 
this does not necessarily translates into better returns per unit of capital.  
Consequently, asset prices go below its steady state level in response to technology 
shocks, and they fall further once agents realise their expectations were wrong. This 
last adjustment also happens in response to unrealised news about capital quality, 
but it is quantitatively stronger. This implies a worse deterioration of banks’ net 
worth in response to news about returns on investment than in response to 
technology news.  
It can be concluded that the main difference between technology news and capital 
quality news driven business cycles, in this model, has to do with the inability of the 
former to generate a boom-bust cycle in asset prices and milder debt cycle and 
deterioration in banks’ balance sheets. It is noteworthy, that unjustified optimism 
about both technology and capital quality generates very similar dynamics in output, 
consumption, investment and employment. This is supported by empirical evidence 
that suggests that recessions associated with financial crises are not particularly 
different (Stock & Watson, 2012). In the next section, I present some robustness 
checks on the main results to discard that some particular assumptions are 
generating the results. 
2.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: CO-MOVEMENT AND FRISCH ELASTICITY 
 
2.6.1 Co-movement  
 
It was mentioned before that co-movement of consumption, investment and 
employment was a desirable trait of the model given the inclusion of financial 
frictions and some evidence from the literature (Görtz et al., 2016). This was achieved 
by setting strong enough habit formation and investment adjustment costs 
(Christiano et al., 2008). We also observed that this was responsible in part for the fall 
in employment when the news about capital quality was realised. It is necessary to 
check that the main results are not affected by this. That is, wrongly optimistic 
expectations about future capital returns can generate a boom followed by a recession 
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accompanied by a bust in asset prices, a deleveraging process, capital liquidation and 
a deterioration of banks net worth. 
Since the key parameter for this strategy to achieve macroeconomic co-movement is 
the one related to habit formation (Wang, 2012), setting it to zero should remove its 
effects. If the results are robust to co-movement, only the qualitative dynamics of 
consumption should be affected. Responses to an unrealised news shock under this 
parameterisation, along with the baseline results, are reported in Figure 4. It can be 
noticed from the graphs that, with the exception of consumption, the qualitative 
results remain the same when the habit formation parameter (𝜁) is set to zero.  
Figure 2.4 Responses to optimistic news 1% increase in capital quality 
 
Notes: Baseline (dashed line) and no comovemente (solid line) 
Log-deviations from steady state except for Returns 
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After the positive news about the quality of capital is received, output, employment 
and investment increase with respect to their steady state level. Also, a boom in asset 
prices is produced and debt is accumulated. Once agents realise they were wrong, a 
strong adjustment in investment is required. At the same time, asset prices plummet 
and fire sales of capital goods are needed to pay back the debt. In this sense a 
deleveraging process starts and capital is depleted, reducing output and employment.  
In summary, when the model is parameterised so that positive co-movement of 
consumption with respect to employment and investment is not guaranteed, the 
main result still holds. This is, an optimistic shock about returns on investment can 
generate a boom-bust cycle in asset prices that is accompanied by an output boom 




2.6.2 Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
 
As mentioned earlier, I followed Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) regarding the 
parameterization of most of the model. Therefore, I have set a Frisch elasticity of 
labour supply of 10 to compensate for the lack of frictions in the labour market. This 
value is much higher than the standard calibrations found in the literature and the 
macro estimates of this parameter (Peterman, 2016). 
Given that other strategies to get co-movement are very sensitive to that parameter, 
it is necessary to test that the results are not driven by this particular parameterization. 
To do so, I replicate the result setting the Frisch elasticity of substitution to a more 
acceptable parameter of 2.5. As can be seen in Figure 5, there are no significant 
changes in the quantitative nor qualitative responses of the system to news about 
capital quality. This is also true for the responses to technological news.15 
 
                                                     
 
15 See Appendix 2 




In this paper, I presented a model where optimistic behaviour about future returns 
on investment may generate not only the dynamics characterising an economy 
during a financial crisis, but also the pre-crisis process leading to the run-up in debt 
and the asset prices boom.  
Figure 2.5 Responses to optimistic news 1% increase in capital quality 
 
Notes: baseline (dashed line) and Frisch elasticity = 2.5 (solid line) 
Log-deviations from steady state except for Returns 
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This excessive debt accumulation, in combination with the banks’ credit constraints 
generates to liquidate assets. This implies a reduction in capital that is bigger than its 
increase during the boom, due to plummeting asset prices and the need to repay the 
debt with lower than expected returns on capital. In the context of the model, the 
banks hold the burden of the crisis and their net worth suffers widely due to the fall 
in the value of assets. However, these costs are not transferred to households since 
the probability of bankruptcy is not a function of the bank’s performance. 
These results, are consistent when co-movement of consumption is not imposed, this 
is, when habit formation is ruled out of the model. I show that with or without habit 
formation the same qualitative results hold, with the sole exception of consumption 
dynamics. More importantly, the model can still produce an expansion followed by 
a recession that is accompanied by a boom-bust cycle in asset prices and a debt run-
up followed by a liquidation and deleveraging process. 
Comparisons of the responses to unrealised technology and capital quality news 
under the baseline specification lead to conclude that banks net worth deterioration 
is notably higher in response to the former. This is due to the fact that technology 
news does not generate a boom in asset prices, and the reduction in them that occurs 
when the shock is not realised is smaller than the bust produced by unjustified 
optimism about capital quality. This is the only significant difference between the 
responses to the two shocks, which suggests that in a very standard DSGE model 
with financial frictions, the effects of news about financial and non-financial shocks 
produce similar responses in real variables.  
The model highlights the importance of expectations about future returns as a factor 
helping to explain deep and long lasting recession. Further research is needed to 
explain the relationship between the size of the recession and the speed of recovery 
that seems to characterize some crises. Future research could explore the time series 
properties of non-technology shocks like the one used here in order to fully 









2.8.1 Appendix 1: the Jaimovich-Rebelo (2009) Approach. 
 
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) found parameters that generate positive co-movement 
with positive responses of consumption and employment to TFP and investment 
specific news shocks. Given their baseline parameterization for a simple RBC model, 
they reported threshold values for key parameters in Table 1 of their paper. Any 
other shock is not analysed in this framework and as a consequence, introducing any 
other shock requires the determination of the threshold values that guarantee co-
movement. To do so, I add the capital quality shock to their framework such that the 
capital accumulation equation is now given by: 





Additionally I ignore the investment specific technology shock. This implies that the 
first order conditions are now given by: 
(A2) 
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(A6) 
 




(A7) 𝜂𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡[(Ψ𝑡+1)
−1{𝜆𝑡+1𝐹𝐾(𝑢𝑡+1𝐾𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑡+1) + 𝜂𝑡+1Ψ𝑡+2𝛿(𝑢𝑡)}  
 
Setting 𝜎 = 1  the same thresholds reported by Jaimovich and Rebelo in Table 1 
produce co-movement in response to technology news. Notwithstanding, the 
response of investment output and employment to the capital quality news shock 
requires a high adjustment cost (𝐹"(1)), but consumption is un-responsive to all the 
parameters except the elasticity of labour supply. When this last is set to infinity (𝜏 =
1) and the rest of the parameters are set as in the Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) baseline, 
consumption and output respond initially negatively to the news about future 
increases in capital quality. Therefore, still setting this parameter to this extreme 
value is not enough to get consumption co-movement. 
 
Figure 2.6 Responses to 1% realised in period 3 capital quality news shock 
 
Notes: 𝝈 =  𝟏; 𝝉 = 𝟏 (solid line); 𝝈 =  𝟏; 𝝉 = 𝟏 (dashed line); 𝝈 =  𝟏; 𝝉 = 𝟏 (diamond line)  
Log-deviations from steady state  
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Co-movement can be achieved by setting 𝜎 > 1. In particular, with a value of 1.2 and 
a minimum of 6.6 for the labour supply elasticity (1/(𝜏 − 1)) we can get co-movement. 
The graph below shows impulse responses to two periods anticipated capital quality 
shocks that are realised in period 3 under different parameterizations. 
These results are conditional on the anticipation horizon. If news is received more 
than two quarters before the realisation of the shock, the parameterisation for getting 
co-movement needs to be more restrictive. Given this, plus the fact that under this 
strategy there are already several frictions affecting the behaviour of the system, such 
as investment adjustment cost and variable capital utilization, and the restriction on 
the wealth effect to guarantee co-movement, I opted for a simpler strategy to get co-
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2.8.2 Appendix 2: Responses to realised technology and capital quality news shocks. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Responses to realised news in baseline model 
 
Notes: 1% anticipated increases in capital quality (dashed line) and technology (solid line) 
Log-deviations from steady state except for Returns 
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2.8.3 Appendix 3: Responses to unrealised technological news with high and 
low Frisch Elasticity. 
 
Figure 2.8 Responses to 1% un-realised technology news shocks 
 
Notes: 1% Baseline (dashed line) and Frisch elasticity = 2.5 (solid line) 
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